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
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
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State Department review completed

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16 October 1973




INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Moscow and the Coming of the Middle East War


The weight of evidence strongly suggests that Moscow knew in late September that Egypt and Syria were considering the initiation of hostilities. By 3 October, and probably only on that day, however, the Soviets apparently concluded that hostilities were imminent. Their actions over the period from 3 to 5 October show an increasing level of concern. By 5 October the Soviet leaders probably expected war to break out at any time, but they may not have learned of the precise time of attack until immediately before it occurred.

There is no evidence that Moscow was involved in the planning of the Egyptian-Syrian attack or that it encouraged it. Instead, during the months prior to the outbreak of war, Moscow was concerned about its deteriorating position in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt. Soviet arms shipments to Syria and Egypt during this period did not indicate any Soviet haste to build up Arab stockpiles (see the chart at annex). While there is some reason to think that Moscow disapproved of the Arab decision to go to war--and may have told Sadat this--there is no evidence that Moscow sought to put the kind of pressure on Cairo or Damascus that might have been intended to force them to drop their plans.





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
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The Soviets undoubtedly accumulated further evidence that hostilities were imminent over the next week or so and by 3 October the Kremlin thought it necessary to order the evacuation of Soviet dependents from Syria and Egypt. The evacuation began on 4 October, and between that date and the 6th there were other signs of Soviet concern.


On 4 October, Moscow's military and intelligence components were significantly increasing their activity.




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
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ANNEX B


SOVIET ACTIVITY PRIOR TO MIDDLE EAST WAR



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
Late September

A TASS man in Cairo told the US Embassy around 10 October that the Soviets first learned of Egyptian attack plans at the end of September. On 3 October Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov gained the impression from a conversation with Sadat that an attack was imminent. Vinogradov therefore recommended evacuation of dependents and Moscow concurred. (Cairo 3054, 11 Oct 73)





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


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



29-30 September

A senior Lebanese Army officer says that Soviets in Beirut were questioning his officers about unusual Israeli military activity and leaving the implication that an Israeli attack is in the offing.
(Embassy Beirut 11671, 3 Oct 73)



B-2





3 October




ask what the Jordanians "were up to" by concentrating forces in Jordan River valley along cease-fire lines.

(Amman 5323, 3 Oct 73)

B-3




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


AM 5 October

Soviet officials in Washington make urgent calls on State officials regarding reports of an Arab-Israeli military build up. Soviets indicate suspicion that Arab governments might be behind such reports.
(State 199475, 6 Oct 73)

B-5






6 October

Sadat tells a Jordanian on about 10 October that the Soviets were notified of the Syrian-Egyptian attack one hour before it took place.


(Emb Amman 5441, 11 Oct 73)

B-6






1200Z 6 October Hostilities begin.



8 October

Egyptian Ambassador Kadar tells Arab Ambassadors in Moscow that Soviets knew in advance of a plan to undertake military activities but that they did not know the exact time they would be initiated.
(Emb Moscow 12551, 11 Oct 73)

B-7



H92/04/006

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